This paper examines whether Euro Area countries would have faced a more favourable ination output variability trade o without the Euro. We provide evidence that this claim is true for the periods of the Great Recession and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. For the Euro Area as a whole, the deterioration of the trade o becomes insignicant with Draghi's`whatever it takes' announcement onwards. However, our more detailed analysis shows that the detrimental eect of the Euro is more severe for peripheral Euro Area countries and that ECB policies have been less eective for these countries. These ndings point to structural dierences among Euro Area countries as the explanation of the detrimental eect of the Euro as ECB policies can be denoted one size must t all' policies. We base our results on a novel empirical strategy that, consistent with monetary theory, models the joint determination of the variability of ination and output conditional on structural supply shocks. Moreover, our ndings are robust to potential endogeneity concerns related to adopting the Euro. JEL Classication: C32, E50, F45.
Introduction
The recent economic crises in Europe since 2007 have left member countries of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in very heterogeneous economic conditions. While some members of the EMU by now experience modest growth and high employment, others are still in the process of recovery and suer from unprecedented levels of unemployment. Clearly this experience is at odds with the goals of the EMU in general and the Euro Area in particular. 1 A popular view on the economic events in the EMU during the last two decades is that, by construction of the EMU, structural heterogeneity, limited scope for scal policy and a union-wide monetary policy has amplied the eects of adverse shocks and lead to sub-optimal macroeconomic performance. For instance, an EMU country that adopted the Euro has chosen a monetary regime where monetary policy is delegated to the ECB (see, e.g., Ball, 2010) . As a direct consequence, a Euro Area country can no longer oset country-specic shocks by a country-specic monetary policy. Moreover, the transmission of area-wide shocks may be heterogeneous due to structural dierences among member countries. In consequence, ECB's monetary policy is believed to be sub-optimal:`one size must t all' rather than`one size ts all' (Issing, 2001) .
Consider the suggestive evidence in Figure 1 below.
2 Panels 1a and 1b compare the unconditional variances of ination deviations from an estimated target and the output gap for Euro Area countries and non-Euro OECD countries over three periods: beginning of the Great Moderation until inception of the Euro, start of the Euro until the beginning of the Great Recession, and, the crisis period since then. The panels suggest that, according to these key indicators of macroeconomic performance, non-Euro OECD countries have been more successful in reducing output variability after the start of the Euro. Moreover, they have been more successful in stabilizing both ination and output variability during the most recent period. However, instead of using suggestive evidence as provided in Figure 1 , policy changes should be informed by thorough empirical analysis.
There is indeed a literature that tries to establish empirically if there exists a`one size ts 1 According to Papademos (2009) , proponents of the Euro Area have seen its adoption as a means to promoting trade and capital ows within the Euro Area with a subsequent increase in competition, the eciency of resource allocation, and economic growth. A detailed description of the rationale behind the creation of the Euro Area is given by, for example, De Grauwe (2006) . 2 Note that these gures are based on calculations by the authors, which we detail in Section 3 below. all' monetary policy for Euro Area countries. On the one hand, studies such as Peersman and Smets (2003) , and Cecioni and Neri (2011) at the Euro Area level and Peersman (2004) in a crosscountry set up do not nd asymmetric eects due to monetary policy across Euro Area countries.
On the other hand, Barigozzi et al. (2014) and Georgiadis (2015) , in a cross-country empirical framework, show that the common monetary framework produces asymmetric eects driven by structural dierences among Euro Area countries. Moreover, Ball (2010) nds that the Euro adoption had no signicant eects on indicators of macroeconomic performance such as the level or variability of ination or GDP. Nevertheless, the focus of Ball (2010) is on the eects of adopting ination targeting (IT). In fact, the bulk of the empirical literature that quanties the eect of a change in the monetary regime on macroeconomic performance focuses on IT. Two key themes in this literature stand out: rst, this literature quanties the eect of a change in the monetary regime on the moment of a single variable, e.g., the variability of ination or GDP in isolation; second, a key challenge in this literature is endogeneity, as it is unanimously recognized that the choice of IT is aected by initial conditions.
However, through the lens of a theoretical IT framework the focus on a single variable does not seem fully appropriate. Measurement and comparison of macroeconomic performance in such a theoretical framework is routinely based on loss functions that involve ination and output vari-3 The most recent data considered by this literature is from 2009. Therefore these papers do not take the European Sovereign Debt Crisis into account. ability. Independently of whether one assumes optimal monetary policy or a simple Taylor (1993) rule, a central bank faces a long-run trade o between ination and output variability. Moreover, the variability in these endogenous variables is jointly determined by structural supply shocks that move ination and output in opposite directions. 4 Hence from the standpoint of a theoretical IT framework, evidence based on the variability of ination or output in isolation appears problematic.
For instance, if such research nds lower ination variability for Euro Area countries compared to other countries, this might simply imply that the Euro Area countries are located on a dierent position of the ination output variability trade o, but do not face an improved trade o due to the Euro adoption.
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Against this background, this paper seeks to examine the claim of whether the Euro Area countries would have faced a more favourable ination output variability trade o without the Euro. To this end we propose a novel empirical research design that is coherent with the bulk of theoretical IT frameworks and tackles the endogeneity issue that comes along with a monetary regime change such as the adoption of the Euro.
Our research design involves several steps. First, we build a panel data set with observations on the unconditional variance of ination deviations from target and of the output gap for twenty OECD countries over the sample period 1985 to 2016. We also estimate the variance of the structural supply shocks for each country by the help of a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR).
Second, as a clear novelty compared to the existing empirical literature on IT, we jointly condition the trade o between ination and output gap variability on the variability of structural supply shocks using a set-up taken from the quantitative analysis of production processes (see, e.g., Kumbhakar, 2012) . In brief, we interpret the variability of ination and output gap of each country as jointly determined inputs and the variability of structural supply shocks of each country as an exogenous output, or, more generally as a shifter.
Third, in order to establish whether Euro adopters, on average, have been worse o by adopting this monetary regime, we rst utilize a pure dierence-in-dierences (DiD) approach. However, as 4 Taylor (1979) pioneered the empirical documentation of this long-run ination output variability trade o based on the assumption of optimal monetary policy. 5 In the discussion of Ball and Sheridan (2005) , Stephen Cecchetti raised this issue in the context of the eects of IT on macroeconomic performance. discussed in the IT literature (see, e.g., Ball, 2010) , the choice of adopting the Euro might have been aected by initial conditions and therefore be subject to endogeneity. This can be interpreted as a violation of the parallel trends assumption between the treated (Euro Area countries after the adoption of the Euro) and the control group (the countries taken to construct the counterfactual), which is required by the DiD approach. In consequence, the estimates obtained via the DiD approach may be biased. Therefore, in order to corroborate our evidence, we also consider the lagged dependent variable (LDV) model (for a detailed discussion see Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ) that requires less stringent identication assumptions and controls for potential endogeneity.
We nd that the Euro adoption worsened the macroeconomic performance of Euro countries on average. Moreover, when we account for the possibility that the eects of the Euro may vary over time, we nd that the adoption of the Euro on average worsened macroeconomic performance only in the periods of the Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Furthermore, the detrimental eect of the Euro ceases after 2012. This timing corresponds to Mario Draghi's announcement about`whatever it takes to preserve the Euro' and the ECB's announcements of more intense and additional unconventional policies such as the outright monetary transactions (OMTs) and the expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP) and its subsequent implementation (see, e.g., Fawley and Neely, 2013 , for an overview on the events). Therefore we interpret our ndings as evidence that these announcements have been eective in reducing ination and output variability for the Euro Area as a whole. These measures may have credibly signalled that the ECB was going to act as`buyer of last resort' (Acharya et al., 2017b ), i.e., what De Grauwe (2012 describes as a lender of last resort in the government bond markets.
A more detailed analysis shows that the detrimental eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance in periods of crises is more severe in peripheral countries. In addition, while the detrimental eect of the Euro becomes insignicant for the core of the Euro Area after the above mentioned policy interactions, it remains signicant for the peripheral countries. These ndings suggest that structural dierences among Euro Area countries explain the detrimental eect of the Euro and that monetary policy in the Euro Area is best characterized as a`one size must t all' policy.
Our approach is related to the literature that uses a Taylor (1979) curve to evaluate macroeconomic performance. Cecchetti et al. (2006) evaluate macroeconomic performance for single coun-tries, based on a comparison between two dierent subsamples of the radial distance of actual unconditional variances from the optimal variances implied by the Taylor (1979) curve. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) extend the approach used by Cecchetti et al. (2006) to a multi-country level, utilizing a dynamic panel with xed eects estimated through GMM in order to infer on the macroeconomic implications of IT. However, as illustrated by Angrist and Pischke (2009) , identication in a panel with lagged variables and xed eects is problematic when the policy is endogenous to initial conditions. Olson and Enders (2012) have also made use of a Taylor (1979) curve framework, but use a dierent metric to measure the distance between observed and optimal variances compared to Cecchetti et al. (2006) . However their analysis is conducted exclusively for the US.
There are two main dierences compared to the related literature. First, our research design does not require explicit assumptions on whether monetary policy in the examined countries is best described by optimal monetary policy or by a simple Taylor (1993) rule. Rather the opposite, our framework encompasses both the ination output variability trade os implied by optimal monetary policies and by simple Taylor (1993) rules. Second, in our empirical analysis we jointly model the variability of ination and output gap determined by an exogenous supply shock.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the theoretical framework on which we base our empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the empirical implementation and the data in use. Section 4 presents the main results based on the DiD, while Section 5 contains our extensive robustness analyses. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
We start out by briey elaborating the theoretical ination output variability trade o in the context of the New Keynesian model. We take the latter as our preferred benchmark for measuring and comparing macroeconomic performance. We argue that the ination output variability trade o exists for optimal discretionary monetary policy as well as monetary policy described by a simple Taylor (1993) rule. Thereafter, we develop a theory-based empirical framework to estimate the ination output variability trade os in economies independent of any assumption about the type of monetary policy.
Frameworks for measuring and comparing macroeconomic performance in monetary theory are 5 routinely based on loss functions. A popular approach is to consider ad hoc period loss functions such as
where π 2 t denotes the deviation of ination from an ination target and x t denotes the deviation of the output gap from steady state. Parameter ω x captures the central bank's preference for output gap stabilization relative to ination stabilization.
Moreover, assume that the aggregate economy is best approximated by a standard New Keynesian model under the rational expectations hypothesis, i.e.,
In this model, i t denotes the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank. β and σ are structural parameters, λ is a composite term comprising several structural parameters. g t denotes an exogenous demand disturbance and e t denotes an exogenous supply disturbance. In addition, the shocks are assumed to be g t ∼ iid(0, σ 2 g ), and e t ∼ iid(0, σ 2 e ).
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Now consider optimal monetary policy under discretion (as elaborated in Clarida et al., 1999) .
The central bank minimizes (1) subject to (3) in each period. The rst-order necessary condition is
One can show that, under this policy, the model implies an ination output variability trade o as rst developed in Taylor (1979) . In particular, solving the model for given parameters implies a 6 See Galí (2015) or Woodford (2003) for more details on this model. In the theoretical literature e t is usually denoted a cost-push shock. Notice that allowing for auto-correlation in the exogenous shocks would not alter any conclusion. 6 minimum state variable solution
where a π ≡ ω x /(ω x + λ 2 ) and a x ≡ −λ/(ω x + λ 2 ). This solution implies the following long-run relationships in unconditional variances
In short, (7) to (8) When it comes to measuring the macroeconomic performance, in practice, the ecient frontier can be estimated, for instance, via a parsimonious reduced form VAR with a supply and demand equation, including reduced form shocks and states an approximation of optimal monetary policy.
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Actual observed variability in ination and the output gap will routinely indicate that the economy is to the right of an estimated ecient ination output variability trade o. Therefore a central bank's monetary policy can be classied as sub-optimal (see also Figure 2a ). 8 7`T hree or four estimated equations are crucial for the Taylor economic model but the economy as a whole is determined by millions of equations. At most, we could hope to get a rough picture of it.' (Friedman, 2010, p.116) . 8 A frequently applied approach to measuring macroeconomic performance is based on the distance of actual variability in ination and output gap, σ However, what if monetary policy in a country is not appropriately described by optimal monetary policy, but may be better approximated by a simple Taylor (1993) rule? The latter is a exible way of describing monetary policies in theory. For instance, such simple interest rate rules can also involve terms for observed monetary policy inertia, feedback to real economic activity or exchange rates. For many countries, such rules may be a more suitable description of monetary policy.
As we discuss next, under such a Taylor (1993) rule, there is still an ination output variability trade o. However, this trade o is neither optimal, nor is it captured by the approach pursued in Cecchetti et al. (2006) and related studies, which builds explicitly on the assumption of optimal monetary policy.
For instance, consider the simple interest rate rule
For simplicity, assume g t = 0 for all t (i.e., we abstract from demand shocks).
10 Then, it can be of countries and compare measures of macroeconomic performance for dierent countries at dierent points in time. 9 Notice that the same arguments holds, if we would consider a rule that also involves feedback to the output gap, i.e., i t = φ π π t + φ x x t , φ x > 0.
10 This is solely for ease of exposition.
8 easily veried that the model (2) and (3) under policy rule (9) has the solution π t = b π e t (10)
where
. This solution implies the following long-run relationships in unconditional variances
Thus, similar to (7) to (8), (12) to (13) show that both the variances of ination and output gap depend on the variance of the supply shock. In addition, the smaller the central bank's coecient on ination, φ π ∈ (1, ∞], the lower σ 2 x and the larger σ 2 π . 11 Thus, there exists an ination output variability trade o, although the latter is based on the simple interest rate rule (9). The challenge is then to develop an empirical specication that is exible enough to encompass both the trade os implied by optimal and simple monetary policy.
In this paper, we propose an empirical framework to tackle this challenge. We make the assumption that the ination output variability trade o also exists independent of the particular monetary policy in a certain country. Coming back to the example of the Fed in Figure 2b , actual variances observed for the USA may be the result of optimal or sub-optimal monetary policy, but a trade o exists at any rate.
Our approach does not suppose the existence of an ecient ination output variability trade o, but solely requires to assume that, consistent with the above theory, an exogenous supply shock determines both the variability of ination and output. Moreover, a stronger central bank preference for ination stabilization, i.e., lower ω x , or, a higher coecient on ination in the interest rate rule, φ π , implies a higher variability of output and a lower variability of ination. As we detail below, our empirical specication models the relationship between the variance of the exogenous 11 It is well known that this model does not have a determinate rational expectations equilibrium for φ π ≤ 1. Our empirical strategy builds on tools developed in the quantitative analysis of production. In particular, we use a specication based on a translog transformation function (TTF). Kumbhakar (2012 Kumbhakar ( , 2013 shows that the input-oriented interpretation of a TTF can be used to model the determination of one or more endogenous production inputs, for exogenous production outputs, and technology.
We use the input-oriented TTF to model the joint determination of the endogenous variances of ination and output gap (i.e., the two inputs in the TTF framework), for a given variance of an exogenous structural supply shock (i.e., a single output or shifter in the TTF framework) and a given monetary policy. Thus, the input-oriented TTF provides us with a functional form that captures the basic characteristics of an ination output variability trade o.
Formally, one assumes that the relationship between the supply shock (as the single output, y) and the variances of ination and output gap (as the K = 2 inputs, z) can be described by
⇔ ln(A) + ln(f (y, z)) = 0,
where we have one output y and K inputs z. Moreover, A captures factors that aect the TTF neutrally. We will be more specic about the assumptions further below.
Next, we assume a translog functional form, i.e., ln(f (y, z)) = α y ln(y) + 1 2 α yy ln(y)
where the following symmetry is imposed: β k,l = β l,k . Equation (16) requires K + 2 additional identication, or, normalization restrictions. As discussed in Kumbhakar (2012) , it is possible to impose the restrictions such that a single equation framework emerges that allows for simultaneous estimation of more than one endogenous input (e.g., input-oriented) or output (e.g., output-oriented).
Since, in the case of the ination output variability trade o, we have simultaneous endogeneity of σ 2 π and σ 2 x , while σ 2 e is exogenous, we can consider the former two variances as inputs, while the latter variance is the output. Therefore, we adopt a normalization with respect to an input. This gives rise to an input-oriented TTF. Following Kumbhakar (2012), we rewrite (16) as
where each input k has to be combined with the remaining inputs l as described in this equation. Υ is a composite term that follows from writing the second and third line in expression (16) in ratios (see, e.g., Kumbhakar, 2012 , for the details).
Next we impose the normalization restrictions,
As a consequence, the composite term Υ is eliminated and we obtain the input-oriented TTF that 12 The normalization restrictions imply homogeneity, symmetry and monotonicity properties of the TTF.
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we use as our empirical specication
where ln(A) = α 0 + v. In this case we normalize our function on z 1 . We would get exactly the same econometric results by normalizing the function on z k . In the particular case of the ination output variability trade o, we have y = σ 2 e , z 1 = σ 2 x and z 2 = σ 2 π . Therefore our empirical specication is
The empirical specication and estimation of (19) allows one to empirically test whether a trade o between the variability of output and ination actually exists in the data. Conditionally on the existence of this trade o, estimation of (19) uses the statistical information on macroeconomic performance more eciently than the usual estimates based on either ination or output gap variability alone. The reason is that in this regression set-up one can use the variability of the output gap (respectively ination) to model the variability of ination (respectively output gap).
Besides, in (19) the macroeconomic performance of dierent countries is gauged while controlling for country-specic supply shocks, which cannot be oset by the monetary authorities.
Empirical Implementation
Our goal is to estimate the ination output variability trade o for a number of countries i = 1, ..., N over time t = 1, ..., T based on (19). Moreover, we want to examine the eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance of Euro Area countries after they have adopted the Euro relative to a comparable set of countries without the Euro. However, the empirical implementation of (19) is not that obvious. In principle, one can estimate the ination output variability trade o by a two-way xed-eect model, i.e.,
where we assume v i,t = α i +δ t +ε i,t . ε i,t is a stochastic error term, α i a xed eect aimed at capturing unobserved time invariant country factors and δ t can be thought of as a exible (nonlinear) time trend, i.e., a common unobserved factor (shock) aecting all countries by the same amount (for further details see Smith and Fuertes, 2016) .
Immediately two major challenges emerge with regard to our research question. First, consistently with theoretical ination output variability trade o, we require observations of the variances of ination deviation from target, of the output gap, and of the structural supply shock. This in turn implies some de-trending of the ination and output data and the construction of structural supply shocks for each country. Second, we need to develop an identication strategy for the eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance. We address these issues below.
Data
Our dataset includes quarterly observations of the consumer price index and real GDP for Moreover, further below in the estimation of the structural supply shocks, we also require a measure of monetary policy. For the nominal interest rate, we rely on the following indicators.
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For the USA we use the Shadow Rate developed by Wu and Xia (2016) since the beginning of the sample. While in normal times it resembles, the eective federal funds rate, at the zero interest-rate lower bound it is aimed to capture unconventional policies adopted by the central bank. Next, for the UK, we use the treasury bill rate up to 2004Q3, then using the corresponding shadow rate developed by Wu and Xia (2016) . Finally, for the Euro Area countries, we use the money market rate until 1998Q4. Up to 2004Q3, we use the common ECB renancing rate. Thereafter we use the Euro Shadow Rate developed by Wu and Xia (2016) . For the non-Euro OECD countries other than the UK or the US, we use the money market rate up to 2004Q3, and then, since afterwards no shadow rate is available, we use a quarterly measure of the overnight bank rate. Ciccarelli et al.
(2013) make a similar choice and use the EONIA for Euro Area countries in recent years, since before the crisis it was indistinguishable from the main renancing operations (MRO) rate, while after the adoption of unconventional policies it dropped below the MRO rate, being more sensitive to dynamics due to the unconventional policies.
Computing Variances of Output Gap and Ination Deviation from Target
Our measure for the output gap is the dierence in the log of real gross domestic product from its trend value computed through the Hamilton (2017) lter, while ination is calculated as the yearto-year percentage dierence of the consumer price index (all items) minus its trend value computed through the Hamilton (2017) lter. Here we assume that the lter-measured trend is able to capture explicit or implicit ination target of the countries considered. This choice is motivated by the fact that we do not observe an explicit target in all countries of the sample. Moreover, in the short run, for instance, during the recent crisis, central banks may deliberately tolerate a deviation from the explicit target, which is a long-run concept by denition. Put dierently, there may be an implicit short-run target dierent from the explicit long-run target and the implicit target represented by the lter-measured trend may provide a better representation of it. This approach is common in the literature (see, for instance, Olson and Enders (2012) , where a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (HP) lter is adopted). Our choice of the Hamilton (2017) lter with respect to the more traditional HP lter is motivated by the considerations made by Hamilton (2017) , who shows that the persistence present in the cyclical part of the HP lter has nothing to do with the underlying data generating 14 process.
Starting from the closed form solution of the HP minimization problem, with quarterly data and t more than 15 years from the start or end of a sample the cyclical component c t =ỹ t −g * t can be approximated by
with
2 , which shows that the HP lter might be expected to produce a stationary series as long as the fourth dierences of the original series is stationary, since it takes the fourth dierence ofỹ t+2 and applies the operator [F (L)] −1 . However, De Jong and Sakarya (2016) have shown that there might still be some non stationarity coming from the beginning or end of the sample, while Phillips and Jin (2015) show that even with an I(1) series the HP lter might not be able to remove the trend. Cogley and Nason (1995) show that for a random walk y t =ỹ t−1 + ε t (where rst dierences are completely unpredictable) equation (21) near the middle of the sample can be approximated as
withλ = 1600 (as is usual for quarterly data) the HP lter will produce an ε t , which is random, and a cycle which is predictable (as a function of past and future observations). The persistence of the cycle is due to the fact that the coecients in [F (L)] −1 depend on the value chosen forλ and may not reect any features of the data generating process (see Hamilton, 2017 , for further details). Even when the properties of the data are such to make the HP lter optimal, Hamilton (2017) shows that the estimated value of λ is always much lower than the value of 1600 customarily used for quarterly data.
Hamilton (2017) proposes a new lter hinging on the forecast made two years in advance ofỹ t+h on the basis of p current and past values. The suggested cycle (at time h),ṽ t+h , derived from the population linear projection, in case of quarterly data would bẽ
For quarterly data, we would have h = 8 and Hamilton (2017) suggests to take p = 4 in this case, interpreting the resulting forecast errorṽ t+h as the cycle at time t + h. Den Haan (2000) has shown that such a forecast error would be stationary for a large class of nonstationary processes. Most importantly, Hamilton (2017) shows that the primary reason of wrongly predicting most of the macroeconomic and nancial variables two years in advance would be due to cyclical factors.
As discussed by Hamilton (2017) , it is not necessary to know the nature of the nonstationarity and to have the correct model for forecasting the time series. Even in the case of an I (2) variable, where the series should be dierenced twice (d = 2) in order to have a stationary process, Hamilton (2017) shows that with p > d, equation (23) will use two coecients to ensure that the residual are stationary and the remaining coecients will be determined by the parameters that characterize the stationary variableṽ t+h . This lter can deal with the same situation considered for the HP lter (in case we need to take the fourth dierence of the time series to obtain stationarity), but without any of its previously discussed drawbacks, in particular without the introduction of spurious persistence in the cyclical component.
Estimation of the Structural Supply Shock
In order to derive our structural supply shock we consider a vector autoregression with exogenous variables (VARX), whose reduced form of order (p, q) can be represented by
where C is a 3 × 1 vector of constant terms, Y t is a 3 × 1 vector of endogenous variables including a measure of the output gap, ination (as dierence from target) and nominal interest rate, X t is a 3 × 1 vector of exogenous variables including USA output gap, ination (as dierence from target) and a nominal interest rate, aimed at capturing world macroeconomic stance and u t is a vector of reduced-form disturbances with E[u t ] = 0 and E[u t u t ] = Σ u . We consider all countries with the exception of USA as open economies (for a more detailed discussion of this choice see Favero and Giavazzi (2008) ). Identication of the VAR in equation (24), requires to impose enough restrictions to decompose u t in order to obtain economically meaningful structural innovations. A matrix A is required such that Ae t = u t , where e t represent the vector of structural shocks. At least n × (n − 1)/2 restrictions on A are required to obtain identication. Usually identication is obtained via Cholesky factorization of Σ u
We adopt a sign restrictions identication strategy. Uhlig (2005) amongst others, shows how to obtain identication of the above VAR imposing sign restrictions on a (sub)set of the variables responses to shocks. The main advantage of this procedure is that only a minimum amount of economically meaningful sign restrictions are required in order to identify the structural shocks.
In case of a single shock, Uhlig shows that any impulse vector a can be recovered if there is an n-dimensional vector q of unit length such that a =Ãq, whereÃ is the Cholesky factor of Σ u .
More precisely, starting with estimation of the above reduced form model using ordinary least squares, identication of a single shock by sign restrictions (as in our case) can be obtained as follows:
1. derive the impulse-responses for the n variables corresponding to a given impulse vector a j up to period f on which sign restrictions are intended to be imposed;
2. draw an n-dimensional q vector of independent N (0, 1) and divide it by its norm, obtaining a candidate draw q from which an impulse vector a j = Aq can be derived for then calculating the corresponding impulse responses;
3. if the resulting impulse responses meet the sign restrictions imposed accept the draw, otherwise discard it;
4. repeat 2 and 3 until a desired number of accepted draws is obtained.
Generally, the median of accepted draws is considered as the central estimate of interest for impulse responses. However, as shown by Fry and Pagan (2011) , the median responses may combine information from several identication schemes (i.e., dierent q's). In order to overcome this problem, Fry and Pagan (2011) suggest the median target (MT) method, taking the responses to a shock, which are overall as close as possible to the median responses, while imposing that the responses are generated from a single identifying vector q. Adopting the MT method, in order to derive our structural supply shock of interest, we impose that for the rst four quarters, there is a positive ination and a negative output response based on 50,000 accepted draws. We create a panel dataset of dimension N × T = 20 × 9 = 180. Indeed, while our eective sample contains 128 quarterly observations from 1985Q1 to 2016Q4, we have divided the sample in T = 9 periods as can be seen from Table 1 . We did this in order to compute variances for ination deviations from target, output gap and supply shocks over a suciently long time window. Our chosen sub-periods seem to satisfy the need to identify dierent interesting economic episodes as shown in Table 1 .
Identication of the Eect of the Euro on Macroeconomic Performance
As previously stated, our baseline specication is a pure DiD approach, where our aim is to infer whether the adoption of the Euro has on average improved the macroeconomic performance for the Euro Area countries. We augment the two-way xed eect model (20) by a dummy E i,t , which is equal to zero for all countries and one for countries when the policy is implemented
where β E represents our estimate of interest as it captures the impact of the Euro adoption on macroeconomic performance.
Equation (25) can be written more compactly as
13 For robustness purpose we have also derived structural supply shocks on a restricted sample ending in 2007Q4 for sign restrictions imposed for one and four quarters. The supply shocks derived for the two dierent samples show a correlation for the common period (1985Q1 to 2007Q4) that range between 0.83 (when we impose sign restrictions on four quarters) and 0.90 (when we impose sign restrictions on one quarter). From our point of view, this suggests that potential structural breaks following the Great Recession should not be particularly worrying.
where X i,t contains all the right hand side variables shown in equation (25) and Ω the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated.
The key assumption here is that of parallel trends, i.e., the average outcome for treated and control group would have followed the same trend without treatment. With non random assignment, it must follow that
(27) Equation (27) is the conditional independence assumption (CIA) in case of parallel trends. It states that unobserved confounders are fully captured with the two way xed eect model. In other words, it says that assignment is determined only by the country plus time xed eects and control variables X i,t , where the latter cannot be inuenced by the policy. β E represents the average treatment on the treated (ATT). 14 However, often, to suppose that the eects of unobserved confounders is fully controlled by the two way xed eect model may be restrictive. Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) have for example found, in a labour market context, that participants to a government-sponsored training programme have earning histories that have a pre-program-dip. Indeed, the literature aimed at evaluating the change in macroeconomic performance due to IT almost unanimously consider its adoption as endogenous. In particular, policy assignment is seen as dictated by previous economic conditions (see Ball, 2010 , for an interesting survey of the literature). Since the Euro adoption might not be exempt from such considerations, we also consider an alternative specication in order to corroborate our results.
We therefore consider the LDV model, where it is possible to not make the parallel trends assumption required in the DiD setting and at the same time to control for past outcomes. It can generally be specied as follows
14 The non-random DiD identies the ATT, see, e.g., Athey and Imbens (2006) .
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where X i,t contains all the right hand side variables shown in equation (25) and Ω the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. The sample in this case would start at the date of the Euro adoption denoted as T 0 . Moreover, note that this is not a dynamic model, since we are conditioning on a xed vector of pre-treatment responses Y i,t−h , where t − h spans the period from t − 1 to the earliest available observation. In this case, the less stringent conditional independence assumption would be
where we assume that conditional on past outcomes and time xed eects, the potential outcomes are independent of treatment status.
15 Given that past outcomes are inuenced by observed and unobserved components, with a long pre-treatment period, as in our case, the pre-treatment variables (i.e the xed vector of pre-treatment responses Y i,t−h ) represents a proxy for controlling for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
The pure DiD and the LDV model are not nested. So, we cannot take one of the two as special case of the other if needed. But if they give broadly similar results, we might be more condent about evidence obtained on our estimate of interest.
An apparently ideal strategy, where for simplicity we do not consider time xed eects, would be to condition on both LDV and unobserved time invariant eects (i.e., xed eects), to obtain an even weaker CIA
However, as discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2009) , this combined approach requires very stringent econometric conditions for identication. In this empirical study, we will therefore utilize the DiD and LDV approaches and compare the results obtained through each of them.
When there is a treatment regarding a multiplicity of periods, one way to assess the appro-priateness of the parallel trends assumption within the DiD is to allow for leads and lags of the treatment, which can be written as
where T 0 is the implementation date of the Euro, i.e., 1999Q1. Thus, instead of estimating a single post-treatment eect of the policy, we estimate m leads (pre-treatments) and q lags (posttreatments) of the policy eect. If k coincides with the date of the Euro adoption m to k − 1 would coincide with the pre-treatment period (i.e., the leads). Proposed for the rst time by Autor (2003) , this is dened by the literature as a placebo experiment, where one pretends that the implementation of the policy took place earlier than in reality. The test proposed by Autor (2003) would then be β E,j = 0 ∀j < 0.
Keeping in mind that this cannot be considered as a proper (over)identication test since it
is based only on the pre-treatment period (i.e., there is no guarantee that trends continue to be parallel after the treatment), the null can be rejected because of two not mutually exclusive reasons:
1. the policy eect might have been anticipated by the economy, and thus cannot be safely ascribed to the policy itself;
2. the parallel trends assumption is not a satisfactory basis for the identication of policy eects.
Note on the other hand that if the ATT is not constant over time after policy implementation, the modelling of β E,j , j ≥ 0, which is compatible both with the DiD and the LDV models, allows us to have estimates of the time-varying impact of the policy. This specication is of great policy interest in our empirical application as it allows one to assess whether the impact of the Euro adoption changes after the inception of the Great Recession. Equation (32) provides a companion to (31) for the LDV model,
Main Results
We present our main results for specication (25) in the rst column in Table 2 . This is a pure DiD approach and requires the parallel trends assumption. Thus, we assume that the evolution of the ination output variability trade o in countries that did not adopt the Euro (control group) serves as a proxy (with a potentially dierent conditional mean) for the counterfactual outcome. In our case the counterfactual outcome is the evolution of the ination output variability trade o for the countries that adopted the Euro (treatment group), which would have occurred in absence of the introduction of the Euro.
First, notice that the coecient for the ratio of the variability of ination to output gap,β 2 , is highly signicant. This means that the ination output variability trade o exists. One can see this by ignoring all other terms in (25) except for the one involvingβ 2 , thus
whereβ 2 ∈ [0, 1) implies that [β 2 /(−1 +β 2 )] < 0, i.e., a higher ination variability implies a lower output variability. An estimate ofβ 2 ∈ [0, 1) signicantly dierent from zero already implies a non-linear ination output variability trade o. Equation (33) is linear in the natural logarithms of variances. However, if we apply exp(·) on both sides, one can see that the relationship between the variances in ination and output is non-linear and convex as suggested by economic theory.
Second, the coecientα e shows that the variance of the supply shock has a highly signicant impact on the location of the trade o. It has a negative sign,α e < 0, therefore, the larger the variance of the supply shock, the larger the variance of ination and the output gap. 
and, asα e < 0 andβ 2 ∈ [0, 1), it follows that [α e /(−1 +β 2 )], −[α e /β 2 ] > 0. We conclude from (34) and (35) that the relationship between the variance of the supply shock and the variances of the output gap and ination is positive, which is consistent with the economic theory discussed above.
Next, the coecients for the non-linear terms ln(σ 2 e,i,t ) 2 and ln(σ function, which is also convex in its inputs. Thus, we can conclude that our data denitely supports a convex ination output variability trade o. Next,γ 2,e < 0 is signicant at the ten percent level, which is evidence against the separability between inputs and outputs in the transformation function. 16 In sum, the signicant coecient estimates provide evidence for the existence of an ination output variability trade o broadly consistent with the theoretical trade o developed in Section 2.
Most importantly, the coecient for the dummy on Euro adoption,β E , is highly signicant.
A negative sign forβ E means that, on average, adopters of the Euro have been worse o due to adopting this monetary regime. Why? Similar arguments as above, yield
and, asβ
We can provide some further interpretation toβ E = −0.827 as it follows that exp(β E ) ≈ 0.44.
The latter can be interpreted as the ratio of the Euro Area (post-Euro introduction) and control group transformation functions. Thus, the inverse of this ratio is ≈ 2.29 and means that, conditionally on the supply shock variances, the Euro Area has a joint variance of ination and output, which is around 129% larger than that of the control group.
Finally, notice that the high p-value for the Ramsey (1969) Reset test suggests that the null hypothesis of the test, i.e., omitted variables being orthogonal with respect to the included variables, cannot be rejected. Therefore, we cannot nd evidence that regression equation (25) suers from misspecication.
Robustness
The results from Section 4 suggest that the Euro had a detrimental eect on the macroeconomic performance of the Euro Area countries. The purpose of this section is threefold. First, we assess the robustness of this nding by contrasting the pure DiD approach with the LDV approach. Second, we conduct a more elaborate robustness analysis for both the DiD and LDV approach. To this end we present results for the pure DiD approach where we check for the existence of anticipation and/or divergent trends and lagged heterogeneous eects as explained in Subsection 3.5. Next, we compare these results with the ones estimated in the LDV model introducing the possibility of lagged heterogeneous eects (recall that in this model there cannot be ATT leads). These exercises also allow us to provide a plausible and more detailed economic interpretation of the basic nding of a detrimental eect of the Euro. As we discuss in detail below, our ndings can be interpreted as evidence that monetary policy in the Euro Area is best characterized as a`one size must t all'
policy. Third, we present several additional robustness analyses to show that none of our results depends on the assumptions made in Section 3. Table 3 provides estimates obtained through the LDV approach. We adopt this approach, because it is one way to account for the possibility that policy choices such as the adoption of the Euro depend on past economic performance. This is indeed a plausible scenario and would create an endogeneity problem for the pure DiD approach. Further advantages of the LDV approach are that we do not require the parallel trends assumption and that it is a way of controlling for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
Lagged Dependent Variable Approach
Inspection of the rst column in Table 3 , relating to the estimation of equation (28) Ramsey (1969) Reset test imply that our estimates are not misspecied. In sum, our previous ndings are robust to relaxing the parallel trends assumption and following an alternative empirical strategy that also controls for potential endogeneity of policy choices and unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
Dierence-in-Dierences with Leads and Lags of the Treatment
The second column in Table 2 Second, the coecients on the leads,β E,−3 ,β E,−2 , andβ E,−1 , are insignicant. We also tested the null hypothesis that these coecients are all zero and could not reject it. Thus, anticipation eects and divergent trends between treated and control group appear to play no role in explaining our basic nding from above.
Third, inspection of the coecients in the second column of Table 2 also reveals thatβ E,0 and the coecients on the lags,β E,2 andβ E,3 , are signicant, whileβ E,4 is insignicant. The former two coecients relate to periods including the Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, while the latter coecient relates to the time after Mario Draghi's`whatever it takes'. We interpret these ndings as evidence that the treatment eect has changed over time. Apparently, the trade o for the Euro Area countries has signicantly deteriorated after the inception of the Euro (relative to the control group) until the Draghi and OMTs announcements as well as the EAPP announcement and implementation, but not thereafter. The coecient estimates can be interpreted as follows:
exp(β E,0 ) ≈ 0.49, exp(β E,2 ) ≈ 0.33, and exp(β E,3 ) ≈ 0.24 imply that the Euro Area had a joint variance of ination and output, which is more than 105% (205%, 323%) larger during 1999Q1 to 2002Q2 (2006Q1 to 2009Q2, 2009Q3 to 2012Q4) compared to the control group.
Lagged Dependent Variable Approach with Lagged Eects
Consider now the second column of Table 3 , which provides the results from estimation of equation (32). In this specication we cannot have ATT leads, hence m = 0. Table 3 shows that all our main ndings are qualitatively unchanged vis-à-vis the ones from Table 2 , regardless of whether the ATT is captured by a single coecient,β E , or by a string of lagged variables.
Discussion
Summing up, we consistently nd a detrimental eect of the Euro on macroeconomic perfor- for the Euro Area during these periods of crises that can be denoted a`one size must t all' rather than a`one size ts all' monetary policy. Moreover, we think that our nding that the detrimental eect of the Euro ceases in period 9 has two implications.
First, it suggests that the detrimental eect during periods 7 and 8 is directly related to periods of crises and so is our`one size must t all' judgement. This would be consistent with De Grauwe's (2012) Eurozone fragility hypothesis. The ECB did not immediately react to solvency concerns regarding some peripheral Euro Area countries by signalling its willingness to act as`buyer of last resort' on the market for bonds of European governments, although this would have been a natural policy for independent national central banks in these peripheral Euro Area countries. Thus, the ECB policy during this time was rather`one size must t all' than`one size ts all', which resulted in turmoil on European sovereign debt markets that transmitted into worse macroeconomic performance.
Second, we interpret our nding that the detrimental eect of the Euro ceases in period 9
meaning that the ECB acted in such a way to make clear that it was willing to act as`buyer of last resort'. In turn, European sovereign debt markets calmed down, leading to the disappearance of the detrimental eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance for the Euro Area on average. This narrative is also supported by empirical work on the eects of these announcements on European sovereign debt markets (see, e.g., De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Saka et al., 2015) .
A more detailed analysis of the relative eectiveness of such announcements and unconventional monetary policy measures is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one indicator to gauge the eectiveness of the monetary policies during periods 7, 8 and 9 is the evolution of the shadow rate developed in Wu and Xia (2016) . We depict this measure for the USA and the UK as examples of the control group on the one side and the Euro Area on the other side in Figure 4 below. We observe that the shadow rates in the control group countries moved below zero much earlier than in the Euro Area. In particular, the shadow rate for the Euro Area is continuously negative only since mid 2013, which corresponds to our period 9 and the Draghi and OMTs announcements as well as the EAPP announcement and its subsequent implementation. This stylized fact is broadly consistent with our interpretation from above.
Finally, our discussion of results so far suggests that ECB monetary policy is`one size must t all' only when it comes to its role of`buyer of last resort' in periods of crises. However, right periphery' of the Euro Area. We nd that the detrimental eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance is more severe in peripheral countries and does disappear in period 9 only in the core, but not in the periphery. This suggests that our`one size must t all' judgement is also plausible outside periods of crises.
Eects for the Core and the Periphery
It is often argued that there are rather homogeneous`core' and`periphery' whithin the Euro Area. The periphery is believed to be structurally dierent from the core in many aspects. This could be a potential explanation of why, monetary policies by the ECB face a problem of`one size must t all' rather than being characterized by`one size ts all' (Issing, 2001) . In order to examine whether the core or periphery of the Euro Area drives the results, we include interaction terms in our specication. In our analysis, the core consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The periphery is comprised by Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, which are the only countries in our sample that experienced a sovereign debt crisis. Subsequently, the regression equations are augmented with an additional explanatory variable that takes a value of one for all Euro countries belonging to the periphery starting in period 5 and zero otherwise. All other assumptions are as in the baseline analysis. This means that we again consider 9 periods as 28 illustrated in Table 1 . When computing the variances for the structural supply shocks, we again impose sign restrictions for the horizon K = 4, but no sign restriction on the nominal interest rate.
Moreover, we again estimate the pure DiD model, the LDV approach, the DiD with lead and lagged eects, and the LDV approach with lagged eects. Table 4 reports the results for this analysis, whose main features can be summed up by the following four remarks. First, we observe that throughout all specications, the estimated coecients regarding the ination output variability trade o are similar to our previous results. Second, again the Ramsey (1969) Reset test does not give rise to concerns related to omitted variables problems.
Third, the eect of the Euro on the core is in line with our ndings above. There is again a detrimental eect of the Euro. Once we allow for heterogeneous eects of the treatment over time, the eect is observed in periods 7 and 8, but not in period 9.
However, and fourth, the coecient estimates for the periphery reveal dierences vis-à-vis the former results. During the periods of crises the detrimental eect of the Euro is more severe in the periphery as the respective coecients are larger in absolute value. This is consistent with the asymmetric eects of shocks in the Euro Area as found in Barigozzi et al. (2014) and Georgiadis (2015) . More crucially, the detrimental eect of the Euro does not cease in period 9. This nding suggests that while Draghi and OMTs announcements as well as the EAPP announcement and implementation had a benecial eect on the macroeconomic performance on the core, this was not the case for the periphery. We also carried out an analysis with separate core and periphery subsamples, where the treatment group consists only of the core or the periphery of the Euro Area.
These results are reported in Table 5 and are consistent with the results in this subsection.
One plausible explanation for this nding is the observation of zombie lending or forbearance, i.e., measures that keep non-performing loans performing. This is associated with a misallocation of bank credit and may prevent economic recovery. Acharya et al. (2017a) present evidence that such zombie lending in the Euro Area was particularly severe in the peripheral countries. However, there is also evidence for zombie lending in the control group, e.g., Japan (see, Caballero et al., 2008) . Moreover, Schivardi et al. (2017) provide evidence for Italy that questions the importance of zombie lending in the Euro Area. Thus, while zombie lending appears to be a plausible candidate explanation, the empirical literature has not yet reached a consensus on the quantitative importance 29 of this candidate explanation.
Alternative Identication of the Structural Supply Shock
Horizon. Ex ante it is not clear for what horizon K one should restrict the signs on the impulse response functions in Subsection 3.3. For instance, the theoretical model in Section 2 above suggests that, under discretionary optimal monetary policy, the eects of a structural supply shock are oset within one quarter if the shock is purely transitory. However, if the shock is serially correlated, the deviations from steady state can last for many quarters and that would justify to impose sign restrictions for a longer horizon. But, in the case of optimal monetary policy under commitment, independent of the persistence of the shock, one would expect ination to revert the sign after one or some initial periods. This reversion of sign would suggest to impose the sign restriction for a rather short horizon. In order to address these issues, we examine robustness of our previous results obtained (with horizon K = 4) and set K = 1. Thereafter in this subsection we refer to the results obtained in Section 4 and Subsections 5.1 to 5.3 as our baseline set of results. Table 6 displays results for imposing sign restrictions for one quarter instead of four quarters, when computing the variance of the structural supply shock. A comparison of Table 6 with Tables   2 and 3 enables us to conclude that all the previously obtained results carry through.
Once we account for lead and lagged eects of the treatment in the estimation with the DiD estimator, there emerges one major dierence to our previous set of results. The detrimental eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance is present starting in 1999Q1 to 2002Q2 and does not disappear in the period 2013Q1 to 2016Q4. This nding goes against our suggested interpretation that the Draghi and OMTs announcements as well as the EAPP announcement and implementation of the ECB have had a benecial eect on macroeconomic performance in the Euro Area countries.
However, once we account for potential endogeneity of the treatment and unobserved time-varying heterogeneity in the LDV approach, we nd again that the detrimental eect vanishes in the period 2013Q1 to 2016Q4.
Thus, although we nd one incident that can be held against our suggested interpretation of the baseline set of results, we conclude that our baseline set of results is, overall, robust to shortening the horizon for which we impose sign restrictions on ination and output gap in the computation of the variances of the structural supply shock.
Sign. Our baseline set of results uses the variance of a structural supply shock that is computed based on an identication scheme that does not restrict the response of the nominal interest rate.
The underlying consideration is that we do not want to make any explicit assumption on the particular monetary policy in the countries on our sample. To make this clear, consider the theoretical model outlined above in Section 2. Independent of whether monetary policy is best described by a simple Taylor (1993) rule or optimal monetary policy under discretion, the model implies a positive response of the nominal interest rate in response to a structural supply shock. In contrast, under the assumption of optimal monetary policy under commitment, the model can imply a negative response of the nominal interest rate.
However, once we allow for serially correlated shocks, even optimal monetary policy under commitment typically exhibits an increase of the nominal interest rate on impact and initial periods followed by undershooting of the steady state. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that, since 1979, monetary policy in many developed countries is characterised by a strong positive response of the nominal interest rate to increases in ination (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1998) . Thus, it seems natural to examine whether our baseline ndings are robust to imposing an additional identication restriction on the nominal interest rate when computing the variances of the structural supply shock.
In particular, we restrict the response of the nominal interest rate to be positive for K = 4 periods. Table 7 displays results for imposing a sign restriction on the nominal interest rate for K = 4 quarters when computing the variance of the structural supply shock. Once we compare Table 7 to   Tables 2 and 3 , we can conclude that our baseline set of results and our suggested interpretation is entirely robust to imposing also a sign restriction on the nominal interest when computing the variances of the structural supply shock.
Dierent Number of Periods in the Panel Estimation
So far, we have split our quarterly data into 9 periods as described in Subsection 3.4. While we believe that this choice is plausible, one may argue that it is arbitrary and that a dierent choice may potentially yield dierent results. In order to address this concern, we provide an alternative choice of periods in Table 8 , where we split the sample into 7 instead of 9 periods. As a consequence, both the nancial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis are in period 6 and the Draghi and OMTs announcements as well as the EAPP announcement and implementation are in period 7. We then estimate the pure DiD model, the LDV approach, the DiD with lead and lagged eects, and the LDV approach with lagged eects. All other assumptions are the same as in the baseline set-up. 
Further Discussion
Could bad luck be the explanation of the detrimental eect of the Euro on macroeconomic performance in periods 7 and period 8 and the disappearance of the detrimental eect in period 9?
Put dierently, did the Euro Area countries experienced a more severe sequence of shocks than the economies in the control group during periods 7 and 8, while this was not the case in period 9? In principle, we are condent that this is not a reasonable explanation, as we have controlled for any (supply) shock that generates an ination and output variability trade o. In consequence, we are condent that our results are not driven by such shocks.
However, it may be argued that other shocks that create variability of ination and output, but do not necessarily create an ination and output variability trade o, can explain the detrimental eect of the Euro during periods 7 and 8. For instance, in the context of our theoretical New
Keynesian model, technology shocks, discount factor shocks, or, shocks to the nancial market conditions may create variability of ination and output at the zero interest-rate lower bound as they can no longer be oset by conventional monetary policy. In consequence, the detrimental eect of the Euro in periods 7 and 8 could be due to an idiosyncratic sequence of shocks, for instance, to nancial market conditions. Yet this is not a likely explanation for the following reasons.
First, the Ramsey (1969) Reset misspecication test is never signicant. It has long been known (Thursby, 1981 (Thursby, , 1982 Our ndings are based on a novel empirical strategy that is consistent with monetary theory that implies an ination output variability trade o whose position is inuenced by structural supply shocks. We develop a panel data set for twenty OECD countries. The computation of variances for output gap and ination deviations from target is based on a novel detrending method, which has been shown to be more robust than previous lters used in the literature such as the HP lter. The variance for the structural supply shock is estimated via a structural model that uses sign-restrictions to identify the shock. In the estimation of the trade o, we model the joint determination of the variability of ination and output by the structural supply shock. The counterfactual evidence is identied via the ATT eect and is robust to various assumptions on the empirical specication.
We interpret the higher ination and output variability in the Euro Area during the periods of crisis as evidence that the ECB measures during these periods have not been eective to reduce ination and output variability to levels comparable with other economies. Moreover, the disap-pearance of this detrimental eect cannot be found after the Draghi announcement onwards. This suggests that the policy moves subsequent to Draghi's`whatever it takes' announcement have been eective in reducing ination and output variability in the Euro Area on average. We argue that this is the case, because these moves credibly signalled that the ECB was going to act as`buyer of last resort'.
Our more detailed analysis shows that the detrimental eect of the Euro is more severe for peripheral countries of the Euro Area. Moreover, while the Draghi and OMTs announcements as well as the EAPP announcement and implementation had a benecial eect on the macroeconomic performance of the core, this was not the case for the periphery. Hence, structural dierences among Euro Area countries may be the underlying reason for the detrimental eect of the Euro. β E,−3 = β E,−2 = β E,−1 = 0 0.7133 0.3675 a The dependent variable is the variance of the output gap, i.e., − ln(σ 2 x,i,t ).
b ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10; Standard errors are in parentheses (cluster-robust standard errors, robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity). c p-values are reported for all tests. (January 22nd, 2015) 44 
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